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I.

INTRODUCTION

Divorce can be difficult for all parties involved. In Illinois, and
throughout most of the United States, there are nearly half as many divorces
in a given year as there are marriages.1 Although divorce alone can be
troubling, the experience becomes even more complicated when children
are involved.2 In Illinois, parents who receive sole custody of their children
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MARRIAGE
RATES
BY
STATE:
1990,
1995,
AND
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/mar&div.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
2. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002).
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can move anywhere within the state without court approval,3 but must seek
permission from the court to permanently remove a child from the state.4
Such petitions for removal are only to be granted by a court if the removal
is in the best interests of the child.5 Illinois courts rely on several factors to
determine whether removal is in the best interests of a child, and these factors have become the backbone of Illinois child removal law.6 The resolution of a removal case should focus on balancing considerations of the quality of life enhancements to the child and custodial parent, along with the
effects on the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent and the ability to create a reasonable and realistic visitation schedule.7
In the recent case of In re Marriage of Guthrie, a mother wanted to
remove her son from Illinois following a divorce so that she could move to
Arizona.8 The father opposed the move on the grounds that he believed the
move would not benefit the child, and that it would in fact harm the child
due to the impairment of the father-son relationship.9 The mother’s petition
was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Fifth District, even
though a true analysis of the best interest factors established by In re Marriage of Eckert leads clearly to the opposite conclusion.10
The facts of this case are unique as it involved a mother and a father
who could not afford the expenses for the amount of air travel required by
the visitation order, and thus, the father’s rights were all but eliminated,
especially because most of the travel-burden was placed on the father, who
was not the moving party, rather than the mother.11 The Guthrie decision
thus condones a visitation schedule that drastically eliminates nearly all
individual and quality visitation time the father will be able to spend with
his son.12 When the proper best interests of the child analysis, as described
in detail in this Note, is conducted using the facts of Guthrie, it is clear that
the Fifth District failed to adhere to the best interests of the child by approving an unrealistic and infeasible visitation schedule and by incorrectly de3. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002). See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d
1041, 1044-45 (Ill. 1988) (interpreting and applying § 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act).
4. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002). See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791
N.E.2d 532, 544-45 (Ill. 2003) (noting that custodial parents must seek permission to remove
children from the state).
5. See Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 544-45.
6. See, e.g., Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d
1209, 1214 (Ill. 1996); Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 544-45.
7. See Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 546.
8. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
9. Id.
10. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
11. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47 (holding an unrealistic visitation schedule valid).
12. Id. at 44.

2011]

MISINTERPRETING THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS STANDARD

95

ciding that enhancement of the general quality of life for both the custodial
parent and child would occur. In so doing, the court set dangerous
precedent for fathers’ visitation rights in the Fifth District of Illinois. In
order to prevent this flawed reasoning and misapplication of the best interest of the child standard from spreading to other districts, this Note analyzes
Guthrie from an objective stance detailing the correct application of the
best interest of the child standard in Illinois.
II.

HISTORY

The following historical information is intended to be a brief overview
of the history of child removal jurisprudence and codification in Illinois.
The history begins with a look at early jurisprudence, followed by the codification of the best-interests standard, including codification into the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, followed by landmark Illinois
Supreme Court cases that shaped and refined the analysis for child removal
cases.
A.

EARLY CHILD REMOVAL JURISPRUDENCE AND CODIFICATION IN
ILLINOIS

The Illinois Supreme Court, in Miner v. Miner, addressed its first case
concerning child removal in 1849.13 At the time, there was a strong presumption of custody in favor of the father, but in Miner the father had a
history of serious misconduct toward the mother, and thus the lower court
granted custody to the mother.14 However, the mother also wanted to remove the child out of Illinois.15 The court held that, upon divorce, a child
essentially becomes a ward of the state and cannot be removed from the
Illinois jurisdiction in a unilateral move by one parent.16 The court reasoned
that, “[w]hile the custody of the child is given to the mother, the father must
not be wholly deprived of its society, but must be allowed access to it upon
all reasonable occasions.”17 As a result of Miner, Illinois courts repeatedly
denied petitions for removal by custodial parents.18
After a century of applying a bright-line rule against child removal in
Illinois, the court became sympathetic to the harsh effects the rule was hav13.
Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill. 43 (1849). For a brief discussion on Miner, see Schmidt
v. Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
14. Miner, 11 Ill. at 43.
15. Id. at 44.
16. Id. at 51.
17. Id.
18.
Lance Cagle, Comment, Have Kids, Might Travel: The Need for a New Roadmap in Illinois Relocation Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 258 (2005).
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ing on custodial parents.19 In 1952, an Illinois appellate court decided to
reconsider its stance on removal in Schmidt v. Schmidt.20 In Schmidt, a divorced custodial mother sought to remove her son to New York because she
had plans to remarry there.21 The trial court allowed the removal because it
found that the move was in the best interest of the child, based on the ability
of the new husband to care for her son.22 However, the court did require the
mother to allow visitation rights to the father during the summer, spring
break, and winter break, and ordered the mother to pay for costs of transportation for the visitation.23 Nonetheless, this case represented a stark
change in the way child removal cases were handled in Illinois.24
After the Schmidt decision, the Illinois General Assembly followed the
court’s view and codified the best interests of the child standard.25 The statute stated that, “[t]he court may grant leave, before or after decree, to any
party having custody of the minor child or children to remove such child or
children from Illinois whenever such removal is in the best interests of such
child or children.”26 This language was later adopted in section 609 of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.27
B.

SECTION 609 OF THE ILLINOIS MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF
MARRIAGE ACT

Section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
establishes the statutory guidelines for determining whether to grant or deny
a custodial parent’s petition to remove a child from Illinois when the noncustodial parent contests such removal.28 The Illinois legislature originally
passed Section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
in 1977.29 This Act requires courts to ask whether removal is in the best
interests of the child when confronted with a petition for removal from the
jurisdiction.30 Following several amendments in the decades since its
enactment, the Act in its present form states that following:
19. Id.
20. See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
21. Id. at 118-19.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id.
24. Compare Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill. 43 (1849) (creating a strict rule against child
removal), with Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d at 120 (recognizing that child removal cases are too
complex for a bright-line rule).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, ¶ 14 (1959) (current version at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/609(a) (2002)).
26. Id.
27. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The court may grant leave, before or after judgment, to any
party having custody of any minor child or children to remove such child or children from Illinois whenever such
approval is in the best interests of such child or children.
The burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such child or children is on the party seeking the
removal. When such removal is permitted, the court may
require the party removing such child or children from Illinois to give reasonable security guaranteeing the return of
such children.31
The language of the statute directing when to grant a removal is entirely ambiguous.32 The only guidance the legislature has given is that removal
should be granted when it “is in the best interests of such child or children,”33 which is lacking because it does not give lower courts any factors or
other considerations to determine what is actually in the best interests of the
children. This decision by the Illinois legislature left much deference to the
Illinois courts to determine what factors should be considered when deciding what is in the best interests of a child. Prior to the Illinois Supreme
Court weighing in on the issue, the lower courts applied a variety of tests
and factors to decide whether removal from the jurisdiction was in the best
interests of the child, and thus proper.34 The confusion was a result of the
ambiguous language in the statute combined with a wide variety of different factors being applied, depending on the facts of the case.35 Courts were
also unclear as to which party had the burden of proof until a 1982 amendment to section 609 added the explicit language, placing this burden on the
petitioning party.36
C. THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS ESTABLISHES FACTORS

In re Marriage of Eckert was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in
1988.37 The Illinois Supreme Court was faced with an ambiguous statute,
and the only guiding principle was whether removal was in the best interest
of the child or children.38 The decision created a list of factors that courts
31. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002).
32. See id. (giving no elements or factors to be used to determine the best interests
of a child).
33. Id.
34. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. 1988).
35. Id. See also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
36. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045 (noting the additional language explicitly
putting the burden of proof on the moving parent).
37. Id. at 1044.
38. Id. at 1045.
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should consider when determining whether removal actually is in the best
interests of the child.39 At the time, it was unknown whether these factors
were meant to be exhaustive or open,40 but today these factors are still followed by Illinois circuit and district courts and form the backbone of Illinois child removal law.41
Carol and Mark Eckert were married in 1976 and had one child, a son
named Matthew.42 The marriage failed, and in 1983, the couple decided to
have the marriage officially dissolved, at which time custody of Matthew,
seven years old at the time, was awarded to Carol.43 However, Mark was
granted “rather extensive visitation rights.”44 Two years after the divorce in
1985, Carol petitioned the circuit court for leave to remove Matthew out of
Illinois to Yuma, Arizona.45 In support of this request, Carol offered two
bases for the move: (1) employment advancement for Carol, including an
increased salary; and (2) the health of her son, Bernie, from a previous marriage.46 Mark alleged that the removal was not in the best interests of Matthew and that it would, in fact, severely injure the close father-son relationship between himself and Matthew.47
The trial court denied Carol’s petition to remove on several grounds:
(1) that Carol had not sought employment in the St. Louis area; (2) that no
evidence showed how the move to Arizona would improve Bernie’s health;
and (3) that Mark and Matthew had an exceptional relationship, and the
removal would significantly harm this relationship, making all but an occasional visitation practically impossible.48 The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court, holding that denial of the removal was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.49 The appellate court held that the relevant
39. Id.
40. See In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. 1996) (holding the Eckert
factors are not exclusive).
41. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 267
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (applying the Eckert factors); In re Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d
1283, 1289-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (using the Eckert factors to determine whether removal
should be granted).
42. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1042.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Carol’s son Bernie Plassmayer had asthma, and Carol alleged that the climate of Arizona would be better for his health. Id. at 1043. Further, she alleged that Illinois’
climate was “unfavorable to asthmatics.” Id.
47. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1042. Mark had never missed a visitation with Matthew.
Id. at 1043. There was also evidence that Carol had made attempts in the past to interfere
with Mark’s visitation. Id. Further, a court-appointed psychologist gave his opinion that it
was in the best interests of Matthew for him to remain in Illinois. Id.
48. Id. at 1043.
49. Id. at 1043-44.
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standard was that a petition for removal should be granted “unless rather
strong negative circumstances militate against it.”50 The Illinois Supreme
Court subsequently granted leave to appeal.51
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court had inappropriately placed a substantial portion of the burden of proof on the nonpetitioning parent, and had thus acted against the express legislative intent
to place the burden of proof on the petitioning parent.52 The Illinois Supreme Court also stated that deciding what is in the best interests of a child
requires looking closely at a number of factors.53 After determining that the
appellate court had committed error, the Illinois Supreme Court outlined
several factors to be used in determining whether removal from the jurisdiction is in a child’s best interest.54 The Eckert factors are: (1) the likelihood
of removal enhancing the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child,55 (2) the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the
removal to determine especially concerning whether the custodial parent is
attempting to frustrate visitation,56 (3) the motive of the non-custodial parent in objecting to the removal,57 (4) the effects removal will have on the
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent,58 and (5) whether a “realistic
and reasonable” visitation schedule is possible.59 The court explained that
these factors must be applied on a case-by-case basis, with different factors
holding more weight depending on the case before the court.60 After an
analysis of these factors compared to the evidence concerning Matthew’s
best interest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that removal was not in his
best interest.61
50. In re Marriage of Eckert, 499 N.E.2d 627, 515-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) rev’d, 518
N.E.2d 1041 (Ill. 1988). Detailing one of the main reasons for reversing the lower court, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that, “The appellate majority found that a prima facie showing
is made when a proper custodian states a desire to remove, shows a sensible reasons for the
move, and makes at least a superficial showing that the move is consistent with the child’s
best interest.” Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
51. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (applying the best interests analysis early in its usage).
54. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
55. Id. at 1045. See also Gallagher v. Gallagher, 376 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. App. Ct.1978)
(emphasizing the importance of finding benefits to the child resulting from the removal from
Illinois).
56. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. See also Winebright v. Winebright, 508 N.E.2d 774
(Ill. App. Ct.1987) (noting the importance of preventing custodial parents from frustrating
noncustodial parents’ visitation rights).
57. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1045-46.
60. Id. at 1045.
61. Id. at 1046-47.
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IN RE MARRIAGE OF SMITH: THE ECKERT FACTORS ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE

Following the Eckert decision, Illinois courts began applying the established factors to the removal cases presented before them.62 However,
confusion and disagreement began to develop among the appellate districts
about whether or not the Eckert factors were exclusive or if other significant factors, depending on the facts of a case, could be considered in determining what is in the best interests of a child.63
In Smith, Cherri Mayer sought petition to remove her two daughters
from Peoria, Illinois to New Jersey.64 Prior to this action, Cherri shared
joint custody of the children with her ex-husband, Thomas Smith.65 The
trial court applied the Eckert factors, and denied removal of the children
from Illinois because it believed that the move to New Jersey would be
extremely detrimental to the mental health of one of the daughters, Courtni.66 Based on the facts of the case presented, the trial court placed significant weight on the mental health of Courtni in determining that the move
was not in her best interest.67 Cherri Mayer appealed, alleging that the denial of her petition for removal was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and, that under the Eckert factors alone, removal was in the children’s best interests.68
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that denying the petition for removal of Cherri’s children was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.69 The court stated that when,
“the evidence shows that a child will be severely damaged by removal as a
result of the child’s emotional problems, this is a factor which weighs heavily against allowing the removal.”70 The court further pointed out that not
only did the mental health of the child indicate that the removal would not
be in the children’s best interest, but actually went further to show that the
62. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E2d 532, 534 (Ill. 2003) (applying
the Eckert factors); In re Marriage of Main, 838 N.E.2d 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (using the
Eckert factors); In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 727 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(noting the importance of the Eckert factors to child removal situations).
63. See In re Marriage of Pfeiffer, 604 N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (struggling
with whether to include non-listed factors such as the indirect benefits to the child).
64. In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-11 (Ill. 1996).
65. Id. at 1210.
66. Id. at 1213. The court-appointed psychotherapist testified that he believed
Courtni was a very troubled child after performing an evaluation upon her. Id. The psychotherapist further recommended that the family attempt to minimize as much stress and pressure as possible. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1214-15.
70. Id. at 1214.
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removal may cause significant harm to the child, a clear indicator that the
first Eckert factor is also not met.71
E.

INDIRECT BENEFITS TO THE CHILDREN CAN BE CONSIDERED
FOLLOWING IN RE MARRIAGE OF COLLINGBOURNE

Soryia and Geoff Collingbourne divorced after fourteen years but had
two sons, Geoffrey, and his younger brother Tyler.72 As part of the divorce
settlement, Soryia and Geoff had joint custody of the children, but Soryia
had sole physical custody of the younger son Tyler, and Geoff had sole
physical custody of Geoffrey.73 Soryia petitioned the court in 2001, seventeen months following the divorce, to remove Tyler from Illinois to Massachusetts.74 Soryia alleged that the quality of her life, as well as Tyler’s,
would be “significantly enhanced” by the financial opportunities that would
result from the move to Massachusetts;75 moreover, she would have more
time to spend with Tyler and there would be more extra-curricular activities
available.76 Geoff contested the removal and claimed that the move would
only improve the quality of life of Soryia, and further that, in contrast, Tyler’s life would be adversely affected because the move would harm his
relationship with his father and his older brother Geoffrey.77 As part of her
71. Id. at 1215. The first Eckert factor is the likelihood of removal enhancing the
general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child or children. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988).
72. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 533-34 (Ill. 2003).
73. Id. at 533. The post-divorce custody agreement provided that the day-to-day
decisions were to be decided by the parent with sole physical custody, but that with decisions concerning “education, recreation, health care and religious training,” both parents
would have “equal rights and responsibilities.” Id.
74. Id. at 534.
75. Id. In support of her petition for removal, the mother Soryia alleged that she was
engaged to Mark Rothman, who owned and operated his own business in Massachusetts. Id.
If Soryia moved to Massachusetts, she would earn $75,000 a year working for Mark, with
the possibility of making $100,000 per year in the future. Id. At the time of the hearing,
Soryia was employed making only $50,000 per year. Id. She further alleged that the company she was currently working for was making significant employment cuts, and that she
feared she would lose her job. Id.
76. Id. at 534. Soryia alleged that based on her current work schedule, it was difficult for Tyler to participate in extra-curricular activities and that if removal to Massachusetts
was granted, Tyler would have to spend less time in day care and would be able to participate in sports, music, and other activities. Id. Soryia also alleged that the Massachusetts
school district was “significantly better” than his current school district in Illinois. Id.
77. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ill. 2003). Geoff alleged
that he was actively involved in Tyler’s life and that the move would significantly harm their
relationship. Id. He did, however, admit that his work conflicted with his scheduled visitation time with Tyler on some occasions. Id. Further, Geoff also asserted concern for the
relationship between Tyler and his older brother Geoffrey, but Soryia contested this and
stated that they hardly share any interests. Id. at 537.
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petition, Soryia proposed a visitation schedule that would provide Geoff
with more visitation time than he had under the current agreement.78 However, the visitation schedule contained more extended visitations of less
frequency than the current arrangement; a factor that Geoff believed would
interfere with a close, on-going relationship with his son.79
After reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court granted Soryia’s petition and allowed the removal of Tyler to Massachusetts.80 The trial court
stated that the removal would allow Soryia to marry Mark Rothman, to
move into his home in Massachusetts, and to work for him at a greater salary than she was currently earning.81 The circuit court reasoned that these
benefits to Soryia would lead to significant indirect benefits to Tyler, such
as being able to attend a school system that offered “superior opportunities”
to those at his school in Illinois.82 Further, the court reasoned that the proposed visitation schedule offered “comparable” amounts of visitation time
to the current visitation schedule, even if the schedules were not similar in
nature.83 In making its decision, the circuit court relied heavily on the indirect benefits to Tyler in deciding that the move was in his best interests.84
The Second District Appellate Court found that removal was not in the
best interests of Tyler, and thus removal was improper.85 The court reasoned that it was in error to weigh indirect benefits so heavily and also that
the first Eckert factor required that the quality of life of Tyler be improved
by more than by just indirect benefits.86 By giving less weight to the indirect benefits and the less improved quality of life, the appellate majority

78. Id. at 534. The “realistic and reasonable” visitation schedule factor from Eckert
has often been controversial, and is weighed differently among the courts when considering
the best interests of the child. Compare In re Marriage of Matchen, 866 N.E.2d 683 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007), with In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
79. Id. at 539-40.
80. Id. at 541.
81. Id.
82. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 541 (Ill. 2003).
83. Id. at 541-42 “The [circuit] court considered the actual visitation time available
to Geoff and Tyler under the proposed visitation arrangement as opposed to the existing
visitation schedule, and found that the arrangements were ‘comparable.’” Id. The circuit
court also found that the time involved traveling between Tyler’s current residence in Illinois
and Massachusetts would not be substantially greater than it the traveling time if Soryia
moved Tyler to Southern Illinois. Id. However, the appellate court later asserted that the trial
court failed to consider the substantial travel time involved and that the trips would be “time
consuming” and “burdensome” making the proposed visitation schedule not in Tyler’s best
interest. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 774 N.E.2d 448, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) rev’d
791 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. 2003).
84. Id. at 541.
85. Id. at 542.
86. Id. at 543.
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found that the evidence of indirect benefits to Soryia and Tyler did not outweigh Tyler’s interest in keeping his family relationships in Illinois intact.87
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second District and granted Soryia’s petition for removal of Tyler to Massachusetts.88
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that in the Eckert decision, the court had
made no distinction between direct and indirect benefits, and that such a
distinction is not helpful in the analysis of the best interests of a child.89 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the key question when analyzing the first
Eckert factor is “whether the child’s general quality of life will be enhanced
by the move.”90 Further, the court held that there is a “nexus between the
quality of life of the custodial parent and the quality of life of the child.”91
For the case at bar, the court pointed out that even though the appellate majority had not found a direct benefit from the move, it had stated that Tyler
would receive a “substantial ‘indirect’ benefit” from the improvement of his
mother’s quality of life.92 The court thus determined that, based on the benefits to Tyler, whether characterized as direct or indirect, his quality of life
would be enhanced.93 Following this decision, appellate courts were not to
consider whether benefits to the child are direct or indirect, but rather
whether the overall quality of life of the child would be enhanced by whatever benefits he may receive, whether these benefits flow directly to the
child or stem from benefits to the custodial parent that invariably influence
the child’s life, all weighed against the possible harm from the move.94
The Illinois Supreme Court went on to consider the proposed visitation
schedule that the trial court had accepted.95 The court determined that under
the proposed schedule, the amount of visitation time between Geoff and
Tyler would not decrease, but rather would stay approximately the same,
and as such the visitation schedule was realistic and reasonable; additionally, the schedule did not pose potential harm to Tyler or his relationship with
Geoff.96 However, the court did explicitly hold that an analysis of the quantitative time under a visitation schedule is not enough; rather the qualitative
nature of the visitation must also be called into question.97 In the instant
case, the court reasoned that, although the visitation schedule was different,
87. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 543 (Ill. 2003).
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id. at 546-47.
90. Id. at 547. See also In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988).
91. Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 548.
92. Id. at 546.
93. See id. at 549 (eliminating the distinction between direct and indirect enhancements to quality of life).
94. Id. at 546-49.
95. Id. at 550.
96. Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 550 (Ill. 2003).
97. Id. at 551.
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consisting of less frequent but more extended durational visitations, it was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to hold
that a “realistic and reasonable” visitation schedule could be established.98
F.

SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS JURISPRUDENCE

In Eckert, the Illinois Supreme Court laid out the factors that courts
should use to analyze whether a custodial parent’s request to remove his or
her child from the Illinois jurisdiction to another state is in the best interests
of the child.99 The Eckert factors are: (1) the likelihood of removal enhancing the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child,100
(2) the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the removal to determine
especially concerning whether the custodial parent is attempting to frustrate
visitation,101 (3) the motive of the non-custodial parent in objecting to the
removal, (4) the effects removal will have on the visitation rights of the
non-custodial parent, and (5) whether a “realistic and reasonable” visitation
schedule is possible.102 The court in Smith expanded upon the factors to
include any other relevant factor that may apply given the case-by-case
analysis necessary to determine the best interests of a child.103 In Collingbourne, the court reasoned that there is no reason to delve into whether
there are direct or indirect benefits, but rather to analyze whether, as a
whole, the benefits are enough so as to enhance the child’s quality of life
enough to outweigh any possible negatives.104 Today, many debates about
how to apply the best interests standard have been settled, but there are still
some cases where appellate courts are too lenient with the custodial-parent
in applying the Eckert factors and severely injure a noncustodial father’s
right to see his child.105

98. Id.
99. In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988).
100. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. See also Gallagher v. Gallagher, 376 N.E.2d 279
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (emphasizing the importance of finding benefits for the child resulting
from the removal from Illinois).
101. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. See also Winebright v. Winebright, 508 N.E.2d 774
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting the importance of preventing custodial parents from frustrating
noncustodial parent’s visitation rights).
102. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
103. See In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1214 (Ill. 1996).
104. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 549 (Ill. 2003).
105. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (affirming
removal despite an unrealistic visitation schedule).
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105

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Krystal and Brian Guthrie were married in Phoenix, Arizona on August 14, 2006.106 A month later, in September 2006, the couple moved to
Illinois.107 Krystal and Brian Guthrie had one child during their marriage, a
son, born on January 20, 2007.108 On March 28, 2007, after a falling out of
the marriage, Krystal left Illinois and took the child with her to Arizona, but
she returned a month later and filed a dissolution marriage petition in an
Illinois circuit court on April 23, 2007.109 On July 11, 2007, the circuit court
issued a temporary order granting custody to Ms. Guthrie.110 Mr. Guthrie
was provided visitation during the daytime of every Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Thursday.111 Ms. Guthrie next petitioned the court for leave to remove
the child from the Illinois jurisdiction so that she and the child could move
to Arizona.112
On December 20, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing on Ms. Guthrie’s petition for removal.113 The record of this case was established through
the testimony of both parents and of other parties concerned, such as the
grandparents.114 At the time of the hearing, Ms. Guthrie was twenty-one
years old and Mr. Guthrie was twenty.115 Their son was only eleven months
old.116 Following the parties’ marriage, Mr. and Ms. Guthrie lived with Ms.
Guthrie’s mother in Arizona for a month, and then moved to Illinois and
lived with Mr. Guthrie’s parents for three months.117 Following a dispute
with his parents, Mr. and Ms. Guthrie were kicked out of the house, at
which time Ms. Guthrie stayed with her mother in a hotel room in Illinois
and later an apartment; it is unclear from the facts where Mr. Guthrie stayed
during this time.118

106. Id. at 44.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The suit was filed in the circuit court of Jefferson County, Illinois. Id. It is
not entirely clear from the record what caused Ms. Guthrie to want a divorce; the record
does indicate that the couple had made an attempt to reconcile the marriage, but that the
reconciliation efforts had failed. Id.
110. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
111. Id. The visitation schedule also allowed Ms. Guthrie to take the child on vacation to Arizona to visit her family in the month of July. Id. The vacation took place from July
3, 2007 to July 24, 2007. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 44-47.
115. In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The employment history of both parents was dismal at best.119 Ms.
Guthrie testified that she had been unsuccessful in her attempts to secure
employment in Illinois due largely to the fact that she had no one to watch
the child while she would be working.120 Ms. Guthrie contended, on the
other hand, that if removal was allowed and she moved to Arizona, she
would be able to work as a cashier at a grocery store.121 This position, however, was a minimum-wage job paying only eight dollars per hour without
any benefits,122 and the record is unclear as to whether she would have
someone available to watch the child while working in Arizona, making
this situation different from the positions she rejected in Illinois, as even
Ms. Guthrie’s mother works during the day.123 At the time of the hearing,
Ms. Guthrie was receiving funds from public aid.124 Mr. Guthrie’s financial
situation was not much better, but he did have a minimum-wage job at the
time of the hearing.125
Ms. Guthrie stated that if removal were granted, she and her child
would be able to move into her mother’s three-bedroom house in Phoenix.126 Her mother testified that she would be able to help Ms. Guthrie raise
the child, but also stated that if removal were not granted, she would likely
move to Illinois to help Ms. Guthrie anyway.127 Mr. Guthrie and his father
testified about his visitations with the child and how he enjoyed taking care
of the child and spending time with him, including bathing, feeding, and
changing his diapers.128 Mr. Guthrie’s father also testified that, if the child
were to remain in Illinois, he and his wife would help the young parents
raise him.129
The circuit court entered a judgment of dissolution of the marriage on
February 7, 2008.130 Further, the court awarded Ms. Guthrie custody,
granted her permission to remove the child to Arizona, and included visita-

119. Id. at 44-45.
120. In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 48 (Wexstten, J., dissenting). Further, the job was also not definite. Id. Ms.
Guthrie had been told by a manager at the Safeway grocery store in Arizona that the store
would make an effort to rehire her, but could not make any definite offer. Id.
123. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44. Ms. Guthrie’s mother claimed that Ms. Guthrie’s
fourteen year old sister could help take care of the child but no evidence that she had helped
before was given. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 48-49 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
126. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 45.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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tion rights to Mr. Guthrie.131 This decision was based on what the trial
judge considered to be improvements in the quality of life to the mother and
child, citing an employment opportunity and the presence of Ms. Guthrie’s
immediate family.132 The Fifth District affirmed the order of the circuit
court to grant Ms. Guthrie’s petition for removal.133 The majority concluded
that removal to Arizona was in the best interests of the child because Ms.
Guthrie had “more realistic employment opportunities in the State of Arizona” and because, although the distance would be relatively greater between the child and the father, a reasonable and realistic visitation schedule
was still possible.134 The dissenting opinion noted a lack of enhancement to
the child’s quality of life as a result of the move, as well as problems with
the visitation schedule being too unrealistic.135
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

HOW TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
STANDARD

The guidance given to Illinois trial courts is to look to what is in the
best interests of the child in order to determine whether a parent’s petition
for removal of the child from the jurisdiction is proper.136 The Eckert court
emphasized that “[i]n removal cases the paramount question is whether the
move is in the best interests of the child.”137 Further, “the mere desire of the
custodial parent to move to another State, without more, is insufficient to
show that the move would be in the children’s best interest.”138 An Illinois
court is trusted with the responsibility to determine what is in the best interests of children in divorce and removal situations, and the court should consider any and all evidence to make that determination.139 To determine
whether removal is in the best interests of the children, courts should not
only consider the Eckert factors,140 but should also consider other factors
relevant to the case and make its determination on a case-by-case basis ac-

131. In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). For an in
depth discussion of the visitation schedule, see infra notes 179-209 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 46-47.
134. Id. at 45.
135. Id. at 49-50 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
136. In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. 1988).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1045.
140. See discussion supra notes 55-59.
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cording to the facts presented.141 Further, “no individual factor is controlling and the weight accorded each factor will vary according to the facts of
each case.”142 In Guthrie, the court conducted its best interests analysis improperly because it failed to appropriately balance all the Eckert factors and
made conclusions about the quality of life of the mother and child not supported by the evidence.143
Reversal is only appropriate when a decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, but a manifest injustice was done to the father in
Guthrie given the weight of the evidence against removal, and the court’s
misapplication of the balance of the best-interests standard must be highlighted so similar mistakes in reasoning are not repeated.144 The Supreme
Court of Illinois stated that child removal petitions should be analyzed in
accordance with the purpose of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, which is to “secure the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emotional
well-being of the children during and after the litigation.”145 As will be
shown below in an analysis of the Eckert factors in respect to Guthrie, the
Fifth District lost sight of this purpose when analyzing the best interests of
the Guthrie child.146
The first Eckert factor is “whether the proposed move will enhance the
quality of life for both the custodial parent and the children.”147 The court
based its decision to weigh this factor in favor of Ms. Guthrie for essentially
three reasons: that (1) Ms. Guthrie had “more realistic employment opportunities in the State of Arizona,” (2) Ms. Guthrie would have had extra help
raising the child from Ms. Guthrie’s mother, and (3) Ms. Guthrie was the
primary caregiver of the child since his birth.148 The record indicates, however, that these findings, and this factor overall, are in far greater dispute
than the majority asserts it to be, and each of these justifications will be

141. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 545-46 (Ill. 2003); In re
Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (Ill. 1996).
142. See In re Marriage of Hansel, 852 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); see also
Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 545-46; In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (Ill.
1996).
143. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988); In re Marriage
of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
144. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1044.
145. Id. at 1046; ILL. REV. STAT. 1986 ch. 40, par. 102(7) (current version at 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002). See also In re Marriage of Bednar, 496 N.E.2d 1149, 1154
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (noting the purposes of the Act).
146. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
147. In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See In re
Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. 1988).
148. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 45.
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evaluated in turn.149 The reality is that the child will realize little to no benefits from the move, and further, that unlike the usual situation where the
custodial parent will realize significant enhancements to the quality of life
from the move that would thereby increase the quality of life for the
child,150 even Ms. Guthrie’s quality of life will not be significantly enhanced by the move.
The court held that Ms. Guthrie had “more realistic employment opportunities in the State of Arizona,”151 but this statement is entirely misleading and should not have been used to support a decision to grant removal.
The employment opportunities that the court refers to should actually not be
pluralized, as it is a single hypothetical chance at employment with a Safeway grocery store that pays only eight dollars per hour.152 This position is a
minimum wage job with no benefits, and there is no evidence in the record
that similar positions did not exist in Illinois.153 Given that courts have held
that an increase in expendable income, income far greater than at issue in
this case, is still not enough to find in favor of removal when weighed
against the harm done to the child’s relationship with the non-custodial
parent, it is hard to imagine that a minimum-wage job can be translated into
any foreseeable benefit to the child.154 Unlike cases allowing removal
where the employment opportunities were significant enough to enhance
the lives of both the parent and child,155 this case is more similar to In re
Marriage of Gibbs.156 The court in Gibbs found that “[the mother’s] employment situation would not be different in either state and [her] financial
situation would not be significantly different if they were not allowed to
move to [another state].”157 The court thus held that minor enhancements to
salary or employment hold little weight in the determination of whether the
move will enhance the child’s life.158 The same is true in the instant case,
where Ms. Guthrie’s possible, but not guaranteed, minimum-wage position
as a grocery store cashier is not convincing evidence that the move will
enhance the child’s life.159 The Collingbourne court warned lower courts to
stray away from allowing any miniscule enhancement in the quality of life
for the custodial parent to translate automatically into an enhancement in
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 549 (Ill. 2003).
Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 49-50 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
Id.
In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 267-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
See, e.g., Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 549.
See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 645 N.E.2d 507, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
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the child’s quality of life, or to believe that any improvement in quality of
life automatically justifies removal.160
The court also relied on testimony that, if removal were granted, Ms.
Guthrie’s mother and fourteen-year-old sister would be able to help care for
the child.161 This testimony, however, is overstated by the majority for several reasons. First, Ms. Guthrie’s mother testified that if her daughter’s petition for removal were denied, she would have moved to Illinois anyway to
help Ms. Guthrie care for the child.162 This direct contradiction would seem
to eliminate this particular justification for declaring the first Eckert factor
to favor removal, but the majority disagreed, albeit through a rather quick
glance at the first factor as if it were almost assumed to have been met.163
Even in situations where removal would allow a mother to stay at home
with the children at all times, removal is still often not granted because this
does not necessarily correlate into a significant benefit to the child in the
absence of other benefits.164 As if this were not enough to call the court’s
conclusion into doubt, Mr. Guthrie’s father testified that if removal were
not granted, he and his wife would also be available to help the parents
raise the child.165 The third justification for granting removal given by the
court was that Ms. Guthrie had been the primary caregiver of the child since
his birth.166 However, given that at the time of the trial court hearing the
child was only eleven months old,167 it is manifestly unfair to hold this conclusion against Mr. Guthrie because, although Ms. Guthrie may have been
the primary caregiver for the first eleven months of the child’s life, Mr.
Guthrie maintained employment during this time to support the family
while Ms. Guthrie did not.168 Had Mr. Guthrie also been unemployed, he
likely would have spent more time caring for the child, especially since he
exercised his visitation diligently following the divorce.169 The only reasonable conclusion is that at best, this factor comes out neutral, but certainly
160. Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 549.
161. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 46-47.
162. Id.
163. Id. The majority concluded that the first factor was met in one paragraph; the
only justifications given for this conclusion were the three articulated above, all of which are
in controversy. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 49-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(Wexstten, J., dissenting).
164. See In re Marriage of Matchen, 866 N.E.2d 683, 693-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(finding that removal would not enhance the children’s quality of living even though the
mother would no longer have to work and the family would live in a home on an eightyeight acre parcel of land).
165. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
166. Id. at 45.
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id. at 44-45.
169. Id.
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not in favor of removal. Because the court relied on three justifications for
removal that were all erroneous and against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court’s final determination on the balance of the Eckert factors
was incorrect.170
The second and third Eckert factors concern the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the petition for removal and of the non-custodial
parent in resisting the removal.171 The court correctly found that there were
no improper motives in this case.172 Motives are often not an issue in child
removal cases because both parents usually have a legitimate reason for
either petitioning or opposing the removal of their child.173 Because of this,
these factors are generally neutral and do not affect the balance of the remaining factors. As such, the fourth and fifth factors are critical in determining the best interest of the child, and these factors weigh heavily against
removal of the child from Illinois.174
The fourth and fifth Eckert factors both concern the effect on the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights.175 Given that the purpose of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is to “secure the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental,
moral and emotional well-being of the children during and after the litigation,” these factors strike at the very heart of the Act itself.176 In Eckert, the
court reasoned that because it is in the best interests of a child to maintain a
close and healthy relationship with both parents, courts should “carefully
consider” the effects that a relocation would have on the visitation rights of
the non-custodial parent.177 It is beneficial to analyze the fourth and fifth
factors together and, to make more logical sense, in reverse.178 The fifth
Eckert factor asks whether “a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule
can be reached if the move is allowed.”179 The fourth Eckert factor is the
effect on the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights.180 If the fifth factor
170. In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. 1988).
171. Id. at 1045.
172. In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
173. See In re Marriage of Main, 838 N.E.2d 988, 989-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); In re
Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 549 (Ill. 2003) (noting motives are rarely at
issue).
174. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 46-47.
175. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1044-45.
176. ILL. REV. STAT. 1986 ch. 40, par. 102(7) (current version at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/609(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
177. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
178. See Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 550. Although the court does not explicitly
state this assertion, it refers to the fourth and fifth factors as “the final Eckert factors” and
analyzes them together. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Hansel, 852 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006); In re Marriage of Gibbs, 645 N.E.2d 507, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
179. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
180. Id. at 1045.
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weighs against removal, then it follows that the fourth factor will probably
demonstrate significant negative effects on the non-custodial parents’ visitation rights.
The Guthrie court did not, by any stretch of its interpretation, create a
“realistic and reasonable” visitation schedule when it granted Ms. Guthrie’s
petition for removal.181 Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that,
“[a] reasonable visitation schedule is one that will preserve and foster the
children’s relationship with the noncustodial parent.”182 In order to determine what is realistic and reasonable, both trial and appellate courts usually
look to the amount of visitation granted prior to the removal action as compared to the amount of visitation that will result after a removal petition is
granted.183 There is no bright-line rule to guide courts as to what percentage
reduction in visitation is unreasonable, but reduction of visitation is still one
factor that courts have and certainly should continue to consider.184
Following the divorce proceeding, Mr. Guthrie was not awarded custody but was awarded visitation rights granting visitation “during the daytime on every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.”185 The Guthrie court
failed to adequately compare this visitation schedule to the one proposed
and eventually accepted by the court for post-removal.186 Although most
courts have struggled with the task of assigning equivalent visitation schedules to non-custodial parents after removal proceedings,187 many courts,
especially those within the Second District,188 deny removal outright be181. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 4951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
182. In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Eckert,
518 N.E.2d at 1046).
183. See Tysl v. Levine, 662 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (pointing out a reduction of visitation by fifty percent); In re Marriage of Johnson, 660 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (determining that a reduction of fifty percent was unreasonable); In re Marriage of
Berk, 574 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that a reduction of eighteen percent was
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case).
184. See In re Marriage of Zimmer, No. 2-00-1163, 2001 WL 34072596, at *6 (Ill.
App. Ct. Oct. 2, 2001).
185. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
186. Id.
187. See In re Marriage of Hansel, 852 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); In re
Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 267-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Marriage of Repond,
812 N.E.2d 80, 87-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
188. The Second District has hesitated to grant removal petitions in the past when the
father has diligently exercised his visitation rights. See In re Marriage of Matchen, 866
N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (denying mother’s request for removal to Wisconsin); In re
Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (denying request for removal to
Arizona); In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (denying mother’s
petition to remove children to Wisconsin); see also In re Marriage of Repond, 812 N.E.2d
80, 87-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (allowing removal to Switzerland primarily because the father
refused to allow the children to live with him in Illinois).
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cause of the change in the duration and nature of the visitation.189 Meanwhile, the courts that do allow removal scrutinize the new schedule to ensure its fairness to the non-custodial parent.190 In either scenario, the established rule for Illinois appellate courts appears to focus on ensuring that a
similar, not necessarily the same, relationship between the non-custodial
parent and the child can be fostered and maintained.191 The Guthrie court
failed to adequately address any of Mr. Guthrie’s concerns regarding the
visitation schedule, and also did not embark on a similar discussion as
noted above on the nature of the visitation; it is therefore necessary to discuss the consequences of the visitation schedule on Mr. Guthrie and his
son.192
The removal order significantly altered Mr. Guthrie’s visitation rights
from three days a week to two weeks in June, three weeks in July, and one
week in the remaining months in the state of Arizona, unless Mr. Guthrie
pays to fly to Arizona and fly with the child to Illinois and the return trip.193
At first blush, this visitation schedule may seem comparable and even perhaps reasonable due to the consistent visitation periods, but the reality is
that there are several insurmountable flaws with this schedule.194 The new
schedule failed to adequately conserve the prior visitation rights afforded to
Mr. Guthrie because he used to have approximately 156 daytime visitations
but now has only an approximate fifteen weeks or 105 days of visitation.195
This amounted to a significant reduction in visitation by approximately onethird, which should have been more seriously considered by the court.196
Not only is the amount of visitation reduced, but the duration between visits
is increased as well. As noted by the court in In re Marriage of Sale regarding a similar visitation schedule, such a schedule would “not only reduce
the number of actual days the respondent sees his son but also leave large
gaps in time between visits,” and the court determined that this would se189. See Matchen, 866 N.E.2d at 687.
190. See In re Marriage of Main, 838 N.E.2d 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (allowing
removal because the father had not diligently exercised his visitation rights and thus, although the proposed schedule contained less visitation than he was previously entitled, it
contained more than he had exercised); In re Marriage of Parr, 802 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (granting removal because the quality of life enhancements for the mother and child
greatly outweighed the only minor flaws with the visitation schedule).
191. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. 2003).
192. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
193. See id. at 49-50 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
194. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
195. Id.
196. Id. This reduction information only depicts the potential visitation days that Mr.
Guthrie has, but not the number of visitations that are actually feasible given the timeconstraints and expenses. Id. The actual reduction in visitation will likely be much greater
given those considerations.
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riously frustrate the father’s ability to maintain a close relationship with his
son and thus denied removal.197 Further, the Illinois Supreme Court also
requires courts to look beyond the mere quantitative result and to analyze
the effects of removal on the quality of the visitations.198 The first major
qualitative problem is that in order for Mr. Guthrie to exercise his nonsummer visitation rights, he has to travel to and stay in Arizona for one
week per month because the visitation schedule demands that the monthly
visitations be conducted in Arizona or else Mr. Guthrie is additionally responsible for the airfare of the child to and from Illinois as well as traveling
with the child on those trips.199 It is highly unusual for a visitation schedule,
ordered in Illinois, to require a non-custodial father to exercise half of his
visitation time in a state other than his residence.200 This places a great burden of travel on Mr. Guthrie while none at all on Ms. Guthrie.201
Another qualitative problem with the visitation schedule is that because much of the visitation is required to be in Arizona, the visitation will
most likely take place at the mother’s residence since Mr. Guthrie does not
have a home in Arizona.202 This will not give Mr. Guthrie the chance to
create a separate relationship with his son apart from the mother. There is a
long list of potential problems with this ranging from sleeping arrangements
to decisions regarding the child during the visitation period to the ability of
Mr. Guthrie to spend individual, private time with his son.203 This will
greatly hinder Mr. Guthrie’s ability to foster a loving and caring relationship with his son when most of the time he spends with his son is also spent
with his ex-wife.204 These issues illustrate that the visitation schedule cannot be considered reasonable, and thus, it was against the manifest weight
of the evidence to allow removal when this visitation schedule was to be
used.
197. In re Marriage of Sale, 808 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See In re
Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (denying request for removal to
Arizona because the visitation schedule would not allow the noncustodial father to maintain
a close and nurturing relationship).
198. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 550-51 (Ill. 2003).
199. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). Mr. Guthrie would also have to accompany the child for this trip because the child was only eleven
months old at the time of the hearing. Id. at 44.
200. Compare Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47 (forcing the father to have visitation in
Arizona unless he personally flies the child to Illinois), with Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532
(granting the father all his visitation in Illinois); In re Marriage of Main, 838 N.E.2d 988 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (granting removal but giving father all of his visitation in Illinois). In Guthrie, the father will have to spend nine out of his total fifteen weeks of visitation with his son
in Arizona rather than in Illinois. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
201. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 45.
204. Id.
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Visitation schedules in Illinois, following a granted removal petition,
are supposed to be not only reasonable, but they must also be realistic.205 A
realistic visitation schedule is best understood as one that is feasible and
likely to be followed.206 Although Mr. Guthrie was granted visitation rights,
it is unlikely that he will be able to exercise them.207 Mr. Guthrie does not
have the income to sustain the travel arrangements that the court would
require of him to see his son.208 The court attempted to mitigate this problem by ordering Ms. Guthrie to pay a portion of Mr. Guthrie’s travel expenses and to allow Mr. Guthrie to spend his visitation time at Ms. Guthrie’s mother’s home in Arizona, but both of these proposed solutions do
little to improve Mr. Guthrie’s situation.209 It is difficult to believe that Ms.
Guthrie, with no employment and only the slight prospect of a minimumwage position in Arizona, will be able to pay any portion of Mr. Guthrie’s
travel costs.210 Further, although Ms. Guthrie once claimed that she could
receive free airplane flight vouchers through her father, a claim upon which
the trial court relied, the record indicates that it is unlikely she could actually acquire these vouchers for herself, let alone for her ex-husband.211
The circumstances surrounding this case are far from similar to other
cases where the non-custodial parent would have difficulty paying for travel
expenses. For example, in In re Marriage of Ludwinski, removal was
granted when the custodial father petitioned to remove his children to Utah
and offered to pay for all of the airline tickets associated with the necessary
travel arrangements for the mother to exercise all of her visitation with the
children.212 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Zimmer, a visitation schedule
was found realistic, although it called for much air travel because the mother offered to cover all of the air travel expenses for the children by using
free round-trip air travel provided to her by her former employer.213 Unlike
the nonexistent travel vouchers that Ms. Guthrie claimed to have access to,
but later shown to have been entirely speculative, the free air travel was a
concrete certainty from her former employer and thus actually alleviated
financial concerns for the non-custodial father, whereas in Guthrie, the tra205. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ill. 1988).
206. Id. at 1045.
207. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 49-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(Wexstten, J., dissenting).
208. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 727 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(granting removal partly because the custodial father offered to pay for all air travel expenses).
213. See In re Marriage of Zimmer, No. 2-00-1163, 2001 WL 34072596, at *5 (Ill.
App. Ct., Oct. 2, 2001).
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vel expenses will have to be shared by both destitute parties at cost.214 The
expenses of air travel for Mr. Guthrie, combined with the monthly visits
and highly segmented summer visitations, leads to a completely impractical
visitation schedule for Mr. Guthrie.215 Given that Mr. Guthrie will likely be
able to afford only a few, if any, airline tickets in any given year given his
current salary, the segmented summer visitation, as opposed to one long
six-week visit, is another added obstacle, because instead of paying for travel arrangements for one visitation over the summer, he would have to
make three times the arrangements in order to receive his entitled summer
visitation.216 Given that up until the removal proceeding Mr. Guthrie had
diligently exercised his visitation rights with his son, the Guthrie court
should have been harder pressed to accept such an unrealistic and unfair
visitation schedule.217
It is possible that, to a family such as the one involved in Collingbourne with significant income to afford the enormous number of flights
and hotel stays for extended periods to avoid visitations being held at the
custodial parent’s household, a visitation schedule such as the one in Guthrie could potentially be considered fair.218 But Mr. Guthrie does not only
get short-changed on the expenses, but also on the time spent to make arrangements and actual travel time.219 If this were a removal action in Illinois that did not involve air travel, but rather only driving, there is little
support for the notion that the noncustodial parent is responsible for the
bulk of the travel.220 However, under the court ordered arrangement at issue
here, only Mr. Guthrie is required to travel, an entirely unfair holding considering that he is not the parent who chose to move away from Illinois.221
Thus, although this proposed sharing of costs might be reasonable, Mr.
Guthrie is still left to handle the majority of the burden.222 Courts have
found problems with visitation schedules that were far less obvious than
those at issue in Guthrie as cause for denying removal petitions, including
to places as close as Wisconsin, because of difficultly coordinating sche214. Id. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 44.
215. Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 545 (Ill. 2003).
219. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
220. See In re Marriage of Matchen, 866 N.E.2d 683, 693-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(finding the mother’s proposed visitation schedule unreasonable even though she offered to
drive the children to and from Wisconsin for visitations); In re Marriage of Elliott, 665
N.E.2d 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding the visitation schedule unreasonable and impractical
despite the fact that the custodial mother offered to drive the children from Ohio to Illinois
every other weekend).
221. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
222. Id.
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dules, and even to the same state at issue here, Arizona, due to the effects
on the quality of visitation that would occur from the move.223 The court is
supposed to resolve each case on an individualized basis, with the outcome
hinging on the specific facts of each case,224 and given the facts of Guthrie,
this visitation schedule is both unrealistic and unreasonable as Mr. Guthrie
will rarely see his young child, and thus the removal petition should have
been reversed.225
Given that Mr. Guthrie’s involvement with his son will be greatly diminished by the move, the court should have looked into the harm that will
result to the child.226 The Eckert court stated that, “when removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial parent’s involvement with the child, the trial court should examine the potential harm
to the child which may result from the move.”227 The court should have
examined the negative effects on the child as a result of the diminished relationship with his father, especially given the sensitive age of the child,228
and included in this examination should have been an overview of testimony from court-appointed psychologists who interview the parties and discuss their conclusions regarding the potential harms the removal may inflict
on the child.229 Because the court failed to analyze the harms to the child,
and because the existence of psychologists and accompanying testimony
regarding the child is absent from the Guthrie record, a generalized discussion of the harms relative to a child being raised without a father is included
within the practical implications discussion.
B.

PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE GUTHRIE DECISION

This Illinois Fifth District case, although merely an appellate decision,
is dangerous precedent in the eyes of divorced fathers. Following a divorce,
it is understandable that one party may want to move away from their resi223. See In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (denying
removal because noncustodial parent was a fireman who had an unusual work schedule); In
re Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); see also In re Marriage of
Hansel, 852 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (finding that the visitation schedule was
“fair” but still denying removal because the contacts between the noncustodial parent and
child were diminished).
224. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. 2003) (citing Eckert,
518 N.E.2d at 1046).
225. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47; In re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d
1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that when a court’s findings for a removal petition are
arbitrary or unreasonable, reversal is appropriate).
226. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ill. 1988); Guthrie, 915
N.E.2d at 44.
227. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
228. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47.
229. See In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1211-12 (Ill. 1996).
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dence for legitimate reasons, but these requests should not eliminate the
noncustodial parent from a child of the marriage’s life.230 The Fifth District
approved a visitation schedule that grants Mr. Guthrie a reasonable amount
of potential visitation time, however, the actual visitation schedule is entirely unrealistic and impractical for Mr. Guthrie, and thus he will hardly be
able to exercise any visitation at all with his son.231 This could cause great
harm to the child, and when harm may result to a child as a result of the
impairment of the father-child relationship, a closer look at the proposed
visitation schedule is necessary and great effort should be expended to allow a father to foster and maintain a significant, nurturing, and caring relationship with his children.232 The Fifth District failed to take a close look at
the visitation schedule and its practicality, and given that Mr. Guthrie’s
rights as a father have significantly decreased, so too will the rights of many
other fathers who come before the Fifth District seeking to ensure a fair
visitation schedule.233
Moving forward, courts must stray from the Guthrie decision and continue to decide cases using a fair and objective balancing of all of the Eckert
factors, as well as any other factors pertinent to the specific facts of a
case.234 It should be unacceptable for trial or appellate courts to ignore an
important factor that weighs heavily against removal, and with little else
balancing against it, without making some effort to correct the problem,
either by reversal, or at the very least, remanding with orders to modify the
unrealistic visitation schedule.235 The opportunity to be a true part of his
son’s life was taken away from Mr. Guthrie, and it is important for Illinois
courts to recognize that, if fathers’ visitation rights are not given true consideration, the wrong decision in a child removal action can follow quickly
behind.236

230. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 554 (Ill. 2003).
231. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 48 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
232. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
233. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 48 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
234. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046; Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 543-44.
235. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046. The purpose of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is to “secure the maximum involvement and cooperation of both
parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of the children during and after the litigation.” ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 40, Para. 102(7) (1986) (current version at
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002)).
236. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 48 (Wexstten, J., dissenting).
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THE POTENTIAL HARMS OF BEING RAISED FATHERLESS

In the United States, there are nearly seventeen million single-parent
families having custody of a child.237 More than thirteen million of these
families are single-mother families.238 In 1995, nearly two out of every five
children in America did not live with their biological fathers, and the more
recent 2000 census information indicates that this trend has likely not
changed drastically.239 There are several documented correlations between
single-parent families240 and the harms to children being raised without
much contact from a father.
Fatherless children are more likely to have emotional or mental problems than children that have both parents involved in their lives.241 The
numbers are often drastic, as one study indicates that children in lone-parent
households are two-and-a-half times more likely to be unhappy and are
more than three times as likely to report lower self-esteem, and sixty-three
percent of all youth-suicides are attempted by fatherless children.242 Some
courts have taken the initiative and ensured that harms to the child from
being separate from the father are investigated, as in Smith, where the court
denied a mother’s petition for removal because of professional testimony
that the move would be detrimental to the daughter’s already unstable emotional health.243 According to the Center for Disease Control, 85% of all
children that have behavioral disorders come from fatherless households.244
This means that children from fatherless households are at a much greater
risk of attempting to commit suicide.245 Fatherless children are also at risk
academically. Information from the National Principals Association report
237. See Analysis of Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census Summary File 1
(Table P29 and P36), POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, http://www.kidscount.org/census/
(Follow “Profiles” hyperlink; then follow “United States” hyperlink under “What kinds of
reports can I generate?”).
238. Id.
239.
Joseph P. Shapiro et al., Honor Thy Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
27, 1995, at 38, 39.
240.
Single-parent families are predominately headed by females at a ratio of approximately 3.8:1 in the United States. See Analysis of Data from U.S. Census Bureau, supra
note 237.
241.
Rebecca O’Neill, Experiments in Living: The Fatherless Family, INST. STUDY
CIVIL SOCIETY, London, England, Sept. 2002, at 5, available at
OF
http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/Experiments.pdf.
242. Id. at 7 (citing MONICA COCKET & JOHN TRIPP, THE EXETER FAMILY STUDY:
FAMILY BREAKDOWN AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN 19 (1994)); USA Suicide Deaths 19791996, COMMON SENSE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Jan. 15, 1998, at 2, available at
http://fathersforlife.org/fv/DV_news_letter_980130.htm.
243. In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1212-14 (Ill. 1996).
244. USA Suicide Deaths, supra note 242, at 2.
245. Id.
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reveals that “71% of all high school dropouts come from fatherless
homes.”246 Unfortunately this is not the only academic related problem with
single parent and fatherless homes. In her report on fatherless children, a
psychologist reports that “after controlling for other demographic factors,
children from lone-parent households were 3.3 times more likely to report
problems with their academic work, and 50% more likely to report difficulties with teachers.”247 In respect to violence, one study showed that eighty
percent of rapists who were motivated by displaced anger came from fatherless homes.248 Further, one of the best predictors for future criminal
activity has been found to be absence of a father in adolescence.249
Although statistics cannot predict the future of every child, courts
should still consider these trends before approving an order that eliminates
most, if not all, of a father’s visitation rights.250 It is not enough to merely
consider the harm done to the father by losing his rights, but rather, courts
in Illinois should always also consider the potential harms to the child resulting from the impaired father-child relationship.251
V.

CONCLUSION

When determining whether a removal petition should be granted or
denied, Illinois courts are to look to the best interests of the child or children.252 There are often times when the best interests of the child would be
served by allowing the custodial parent to remove the child from Illinois,
however, there are just as many scenarios where a similar move would not
be in the best interests of the child.253 In order to determine whether removal is proper, courts should weigh the concerns about maintaining and preserving the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent against the
enhancement of the quality of life for both the custodial parent and the
246. The Impact on Our Children, COMMON SENSE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Jan. 30,
1998, at 3, available at http://fathersforlife.org/fv/DV_news_letter_980130.htm.
247.
O’Neill, supra note 241 at 7 (citing MONICA COCKET & JOHN TRIPP, THE
EXETER FAMILY STUDY: FAMILY BREAKDOWN AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN 24-25 (1994)).
248. See Raymond A. Knight & Robert A. Prentky, The Developmental Antecedents
and Adult Adaptations of Rapist Subtypes, 14 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 403, 403-26
(1987).
249. See Shapiro, supra note 239, at 38-39.
250. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ill. 1988); In re Marriage
of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 540-41 (Ill. 2003); In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d
1209, 1211-12 (Ill. 1996).
251. See Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1211-12; Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 541.
252. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
253. See In re Marriage of Matchen, 866 N.E.2d 683, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding removal to Wisconsin was not in best interest of the child); In re Marriage of Repond,
812 N.E.2d 80, 87-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding removal to Switzerland was in the best
interests of the child).
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child.254 This closely follows the Supreme Court of Illinois’ vision that
“[w]hen removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial parent’s involvement with the child, the trial court should examine the potential harm to the child which may result from the move.”255
In Guthrie, the first Eckert factor may have been neutral on its own, but
given that the child will lose almost all contact with his father, and given
the lack of any real enhancement to the child’s quality of life from the
move, the child may actually suffer significant harm from the move to Arizona.256 Had the Guthrie court conducted the best interest standard properly
and balanced the factors correctly, Guthrie would likely have been decided
differently.257
The major flaw with the Guthrie decision is the court’s neglect of the
fairness and reasonability of the visitation schedule, especially when compared to the minimal benefits the child would gain by the move.258 A visitation schedule does not have to be perfect. In fact, if removal were only allowed when there was a potentially perfect visitation schedule, then removal would never be granted and custodial parents would never be able to
move out of Illinois’ jurisdiction.259 But visitation schedules in Illinois need
only be reasonable and realistic to be satisfactory in the eyes of the law.260
However, for Mr. Guthrie, the visitation schedule given to him by the court
is a death sentence for his relationship with his son.261 Between the quality
of life enhancements for Mr. Guthrie’s custodial ex-wife and his son and
the impairments to his own relationship and involvement with his son due
to an unreasonable and unrealistic visitation schedule, the scale is so imbalanced that it is clear that a manifest injustice has been done.262 The Fifth
District’s interpretation of the Eckert factors in this case must be ignored by
future courts if the rights of Illinois fathers are to be preserved at all.263 This
imbalanced approach to creating visitation schedules violates clearly determined values in protecting fathers’ visitation rights and, if followed by oth-

254. See In re Marriage of Parr, 802 N.E.2d 393, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
255. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
256. See In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 48-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(Wexstten, J., dissenting).
257. See Id. at 44, 47.
258. See id.
259. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 540-41 (Ill. 2003).
260. Id.
261. See Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 46-47.
262. Id.
263. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ill. 1988); Collingbourne,
791 N.E.2d at 540-41.
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ers, will likely result in the severe decline of visitation rights for divorced
fathers in Illinois in the coming years.264
DEVIN NOBLE

264. See Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046; Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 540-41; see also
Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d at 47-48.
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